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Book Notes
THE LA WAND ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE & DIVORCE EDITED
BY ANTONY W. DNES & ROBERT ROWTHORN (CAMBRIDGE:
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2002). Pp. ix + 232. Index,
contributors, selected bibliographies. $97.95 hardcover, $34.95 paper.
BY MARY PATERSON
This intriguing collection of essays examines the economics of
marriage in four contexts-marriage as contract, divorce regulation,
bargaining, and empirical work. In the first group, Lloyd R. Cohen
conceives of marriage as a long-term contract protecting against the risk of
losing one's investment in marital assets. Elizabeth S. Scott argues for
covenant marriages with counselling and waiting periods prior to divorce
to reinforce the marriage contract. In the second group, Allen M. Parkman
argues for mutual consent divorce to force couples to consider the benefit
of divorce for the couple and not the individual. Katherine Shaw Spaht also
encourages the use of fault grounds in conjunction with covenant marriages
to protect children. Eric Rasmusen applies economic theory to adultery,
concluding that the maximum social surplus occurs when the legal penalty
for adultery is high enough to deter adultery without monitoring by the
other spouse. In the third group, Antony W. Dnes argues that as marriage
becomes an increasingly troubled institution, cohabitation will become an
increasingly rational arrangement, especially if there are cohabitation
agreements. Robert Rowthorn focuses on the need to strengthen the signal
that marriage generates by ensuring that only efficient divorces occur.
Martin Zelder completes the bargaining theme with a discussion of game
theory, concluding that economic theories are more important to the
marriage experience. In the fourth group, Steven L. Nock and Margaret F.
Brinig begin the empirical work by presenting a five-year study that
analyzes the impact of division of labour and both spouses' perceptions of
the fairness of that division on marriage. Douglas W. Allen examines the
impact of legal reforms on marriage and divorce, concluding that the
liberalization of divorce laws increases the rate of divorce, the participation
of women in the workforce, and the age at which people marry. Finally, Ian
Smith explains that divorce rates in Europe are affected by the
liberalization of divorce laws, the economic status of women, and the
religious behaviour of the country.
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